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Abstract  
This study examines the relationship between breadths of two different modes of external 
knowledge: R&D outsourcing and cooperation. Building upon transaction costs literature and 
literature on research partner breadth and R&D outsourcing we hypothesize an U-inverted 
relationship between outsourcing breadth and innovation performance and a complementary 
relationship between R&D outsourcing and R&D cooperation. The model is tested on a large 
sample based on CIS survey for Spain. The empirical analysis confirms the U-inverted 
relationship between outsourcing breadth and innovation but also reveals an interesting result: 
the complementary effect of R&D cooperation varies with the level of R&D outsourcing 
breadth and it is not confirmed for low and medium levels of R&D outsourcing breadth. The 
results have important implications for theory on the selection of different modes of inbound 
open innovation and for managers and their cooperation and outsourcing strategies.  
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MODES OF INBOUND KNOWLEDGE FLOWS: ARE COOPERATION AND 
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1. Introduction 
This study analyzes the impact of R&D outsourcing breadth, as well as the moderator effect 
of cooperation on innovation performance. R&D outsourcing and cooperation are two 
different strategies to integrate external technology. R&D Outsourcing is usually performed to 
reduce costs, reinforce specialization, and achieve economies of scale, while collaboration is 
motivated by strategic rather than cost considerations (Gooroochurn and Hanley 2007; Narula 
2001). As a result, outsourcing, compared to collaboration, is less common in basic research 
(Andries and Thorwarth 2014), and is frequently used in non-core activities where knowledge 
is explicit and less complex (Spithoven and Teirlinck 2015; Weigelt 2009), and for more 
incremental innovation (Stanko and Olleros 2013). We believe that it is essential to examine 
the dynamic between outsourcing and cooperation strategies, taking into account their 
different natures and goals. 
Most of the research has examined the ‘make’ or ‘buy’ trade-off and the complementarity or 
substitutability between internal and external R&D (Andries and Thorwarth 2014; Audretsch, 
Menkveld and Thurik 1996; Berchicci 2013; Lokshin, Belderbos and Carree 2008; Hagedoorn 
and Wang 2012; Love and Roper 2001, 2009; McIvor 2009; Piga and Vivarelli 2003, 2004; 
Schmiedeberg 2008; Veugelers and Cassiman 1999). While valuable, this strand of research 
does not answer several questions related to the best selection models to define the inbound 
open innovation strategy for external knowledge. 
Open Innovation (OI) has been defined as ‘a distributed innovation process based on 
purposively managed knowledge flows across organizational boundaries, using pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary mechanisms in line with the organization’s business model’ (Chesbrough and 
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Bogers 2014:17). Accordingly, different openness strategies constitute the OI paradigm 
(Dahlander and Gann 2010). Among these strategies, outsourcing and cooperation play key 
roles in inbound flows of knowledge and in-bound OI.  
A number of papers have analyzed R&D outsourcing and R&D cooperation in a common 
framework (Dhont-Peltraut and Pfister 2011; Holl and Rama 2014; Tsai and Wang 2008, 
2009), but they do not consider the interrelation between these strategies. Firms frequently 
combine these two modes of in-bound OI and only some scholars have examining the 
complementarities of R&D cooperation and R&D outsourcing (Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; Lin, 
Hsiao and Lin 2013; Teirlinck and Spithoven 2011, 2013), considering it from different 
perspectives. For example, while Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) focused on external resources 
from partner variety and experience; Teirlinck and Spithoven (2011, 2013) analyzed firms’ 
internal resources in terms of research managers and R&D experts; and Lin et al. (2013) made 
a methodological contribution by considering a method that combined adoption and 
productivity approaches. Though much progress has been made, research comparing different 
modes of in-bound OI still has a long way to go (Bahemia and Squire 2010).  
This research explores this comparatively underexplored research field by focusing on R&D 
cooperation and R&D outsourcing, and underpinning the analysis of their complementarities 
through the concept of external knowledge source breadth. Breadth refers to the extent that 
‘firms access different external knowledge sources’ (Zobel 2013: 68), such as customers, 
suppliers, competitors, universities, research centers, etc. Breadth is an essential part of 
literature studying the impact of inbound knowledge flows (Laursen and Salter 2006; 
Rothaermel and Deeds 2006; Bahemia and Squire 2010; Leiponen and Helfat 2010; 
Oerlemans, Knoben and Pretorius 2013; Collins and Riley 2013; Leeuw, Lokshin and 
Duysters 2014). Breadth has been mainly studied for cooperation activities, but it can be also 
conceptualized for R&D outsourcing strategies. Some studies have considered the 
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“broadness” of outsourcing by the number of different activities (Gilley and Rasheed 2000), 
but outsourcing breadth in terms of number of different external sources has barely been 
analyzed. Therefore, our first contribution is to analyze the impact of R&D outsourcing on 
innovation performance by measuring it in the same manner as for cooperation, in terms of 
breadth. 
Secondly, we study the moderator effect of cooperation breadth on the relationship between 
outsourcing breadth and the innovative performance of the firm. Our paper offers a new 
perspective with regard to the traditional ‘buy’, ‘make’ or ‘ally’ trade-off because we examine 
the effects of the interaction of two open innovation strategies—cooperation breadth and 
R&D outsourcing breadth. This is important because firms may create mutual relational 
capital that generates synergies and economies of scale and scope. Because the paper focuses 
more on the learning process and relational capabilities arising from the exposure to different 
sources of knowledge, we do not consider sourcing depth. 
We test our model on a large CIS data set of Spanish firms. This research uses pooled data 
from a longitudinal sample to evaluate the impact of different inbound OI strategies breadths 
on firm innovative performance. We found that there is a U-inverted relationship between 
outsourcing breadth and innovation performance and a complementary relationship between 
R&D outsourcing and R&D cooperation, but that the complementary effect of R&D 
cooperation varies with the level of R&D outsourcing breadth, and is not confirmed for low 
and medium levels of R&D outsourcing breadth. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the 
theoretical background of inbound OI strategies, and we develop our hypotheses in Section 3. 
The fourth section describes methodology, and in the fifth section we present the statistical 
method and the results of our analyses. We then discuss our findings. We conclude with 
implications and directions for future research. 
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2. Literature background 
Theoretical literature has emphasized that different openness strategies exist. Dahnlander and 
Gann (2010) and Chesbrough and Bogers (2014) identified two main inbound strategies: 
sourcing and acquiring. Sourcing is a non-pecuniary type of openness, in which firms use and 
absorb external knowledge into their innovation processes; while acquiring is a pecuniary 
inbound innovation involving the acquisition of external knowledge, which is then integrated 
into the innovation process. In the same way, Tsai and Wang (2008, 2009) argued that there 
are two ways to access external technology: quasi-external activities such as technology 
cooperation, and fully external activities, i.e., market procurement, such as R&D outsourcing 
and licensing.  
R&D outsourcing refers to the purchase by an enterprise of creative work performed by other 
enterprises or by public or private research organizations to increase the stock of knowledge 
for developing new and improved products and processes (OECD 2005). Consequently, the 
transformation of potential knowledge into realized knowledge is made by an external firm 
that transfers it together with its exploitation rights to the payer firm in the manner 
contractually specified (Grimpe and Kaiser 2010). Firms with few resources and looking for 
low risk and low cost knowledge exchange employ R&D outsourcing (Gassmann, Enkel and 
Chesbrough 2010), and many firms tend to outsource non-core activities (Gilley and Raseed 
2000; Mudambi and Tallman 2010; Narula 2001), as these activities are relatively 
standardized (Teirlinck and Spithoven 2013), involve explicit knowledge and entail low levels 
of complexity and uncertainty (Howells, Gagliardi and Malik 2008). R&D outsourcing is 
considered the most basic inbound OI strategy. Firms do not enter into long relationships with 
the R&D suppliers but temporary contracts for a previously specified purpose (Grimpe and 
Kaiser 2010), where firms can change suppliers when new or cost-effective technologies are 
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available in the market (Gilley and Rasheed 2000). Although firms that incorporate 
outsourced knowledge into their innovation processes may encounter coordination and 
communication challenges arising from R&D outsourcing activities (Tsai and Wang 2009), 
especially, if R&D outsourcing breadth increases, the interdependence between partners is 
minimum (Narula 2001).  
Compared to R&D outsourcing, collaboration is considered a more open strategy of 
knowledge sharing (Chesbrough, 2012; Teirlinck and Spithoven 2008), where knowledge 
exchange is more complex and tacit (Teirlinck and Spithoven 2013). R&D cooperation 
usually focuses on a common project for a medium period of time, where partners share 
common objectives in the development of a specific technology (Hagedoorn 1993; Trombini 
and Comacchio 2012). Here, the transformation of valuable knowledge is made jointly by the 
firm and the partner, so a higher degree of learning is likely to occur (Fey and Birkinshaw 
2005). The governance cost of the ‘ally’ mode is higher than the ‘buy’ mode because 
cooperation involves specialized assets (Williamson 1991). In addition, the opportunity cost 
of cooperation is potentially higher than in R&D outsourcing because the R&D outcome is 
uncertain (Holmstrom 1989) and firms cannot observe partners behavior (Oxley 1997), who 
are often engaged in attempts to outlearn each other (Khanna, Gulati and Nohria 1998) since 
knowledge-based assets are imperfectly protected (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2002). To 
succeed in joint innovation, improve firm performance and ensure survival chances 
(Mitsuhashi and Greve 2009), firm’s technologies or knowledge bases must ‘fit’ (Baum, 
Cowan and Jonard. 2010). Cooperation and R&D outsourcing differs in terms of availability 
and training of research managers and R&D experts (Teirlinck and Spithoven 2013). 
Cooperation may require more advanced management capabilities (Lane and Lubatkin 1998), 
and it changes the internal cost structure of the firm (Kale and Singh 2009). Table 1 
summarizes the differences between R&D outsourcing and cooperation. 
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Table 1 about here 
 
3. Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
3.1 R&D outsourcing breadth 
Openness breadth refers to the extent to which ‘firms access different external knowledge 
sources’, such as customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, research centers, etc. (Zobel 
2013: 68). However, this dimension has been unexplored in outsourcing empirical literature. 
Various scholars have pointed to the existence of a curvilinear relationship (inverted U-shape) 
between outsourcing intensity and firm performance (Kotabe and Mol 2009; Kotabe, Mol, 
Murray and Parente 2012; Leachman, Pegels and Shin 2005; Rothaermel, Hitt and Jobe 2006; 
Grimpe and Kaiser 2010; Berchicci 2013). Focusing on innovation literature, Grimpe and 
Kaiser (2010) studied the benefits and challenges of R&D outsourcing, discovering an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between R&D outsourcing and innovation performance. They argued 
that the effects of R&D outsourcing on innovation performance is initially positive because it 
allows access to valuable resources not available internally, fostering greater efficiency, 
lowering costs and boosting their innovation processes. However, with greater intensities of 
R&D outsourcing, the returns from additional R&D outsourcing become negative because of 
the dilution of firm-specific resources, the weakening of innovative capabilities, and the 
increasing need for management attention. Berchicci (2013) also noted that R&D outsourcing 
is positively related to innovation performance but only up to a point, because excessive 
outsourcing increases search, coordinating and monitoring costs and could generate a risk of 
external knowledge dependence. Graphically speaking, this implies that the benefits of 
outsourcing intensity on innovation creates an inverted U-shape. In these studies, R&D 
outsourcing has been measured in different ways, such as R&D external expenditures 
(Grimpe and Kaiser 2010) or number of activities (Berchicci 2013).  
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We extend that strand of research and consider that outsourcing breadth is likely to have an 
effect on the performance of the firm’s overall OI strategy. Prior research has shown that 
knowledge search breadth brings greater innovation (Rothaermel and Deeds 2006; Bahemia 
and Squire 2010; Leiponen and Helfat 2010; Zobel 2013) because it pools the efforts of 
diverse knowledge sources and it enhances the potential for new products and a better 
matching of products and consumer preferences (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell 2010). 
Some studies have also shown that performance decreases when firms open their innovation 
process to many external knowledge sources (Laursen and Salter 2006; Rothaermel and 
Deeds 2006). We propose that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between R&D 
outsourcing breadth and firms’ innovative performance.  
The benefits of R&D outsourcing breadth can be summarized through Cui, Loch, Grosmann 
and He (2012)’s motivations to outsource: (1) economical motivation to reduce internal R&D 
investment (factory and premise costs) (2) industrial motivation, as outsourcing decreases 
firms’ innovative processes cadence and market cycle; (3) market motivation as outsourcing 
breadth could open new markets or lead to better understanding of current market needs; (4) 
technological motivation since a greater variety of outsourcing firms provides new 
technologies with the potential for radical innovations; (5) strategic motivation as non-core 
activities are outsourced to specialized outsourcers who know market regulations, standards 
and structures, so firms are able to focus on their core competencies; and (6) organizational 
motivation as increased outsourcing breadth reveals and overcomes internal barriers and 
rigidities, and encourages organizational change and innovation. However, increased 
outsourcing breadth also entails certain challenges. First, it is difficult to find the ‘right’ 
outsourcer (Tsai and Wang 2009) whose technology meets the firm’s competitive strategy and 
is reliable (Hoecht and Trott 2006; Howells et al. 2008; Sen and MacPherson 2009). Second, 
communication problems increases with outsourcing breadth because firms may lack the 
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expertise related to that area and being unable to communicate professionally with 
outsourcers. Third, outsourcers can sell their technologies to competitors (Tsai and Wang 
2009) and extend them across the whole industry (Hoecht and Trott 2006), so it does not 
provide a competitive advantage for the firm. Finally, outsourcing breadth creates a risk of 
external dependency (Rothaermel et al. 2006) since firms acquire external technology rather 
than internally developing it (Tsai and Wang 2009; Wang, Roijjakers and Vanhaverbeke 
2013), reducing their knowledge base in all areas and thereby damaging firms’ absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Therefore, R&D outsourcing breadth provides 
immediate access to different technologies and knowledge with few bureaucratic costs, 
reducing firms’ innovative process time and the costs and risks of internal R&D. However, 
higher levels of R&D outsourcing breadth increase transaction costs and the risks of 
depending on external outsourcers. Hence, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth 
and innovation performance.  
 
3.2 The moderator role of cooperation 
The impact of cooperation on innovation performance has received considerable attention in 
literature. Apart from the direct effect of cooperation breadth on the chances of positive 
innovation outcomes (Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007; Leiponen and Helfat 2010; Zobel 
2013), we expect cooperation to have moderating effects on the relationship between R&D 
outsourcing breadth and firms’ innovation performance. In this paper we are specifically 
interested in the effect of the joint adoption of cooperation breadth and R&D outsourcing 
breadth on innovation performance.  
Over the last years, Transaction Costs Economy (TCE) and the Resource-based view (RBV) 
have converged somewhat in the explanation of knowledge flows because of their 
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complementary roles and co-evolution (Spithoven and Teirlinck 2015). Basing our arguments 
on TCE and RBV, we consider that cooperation moderates the relationship between R&D 
outsourcing and innovation performance through two mechanisms: absorptive capacity and 
relational capability. Our framework weights the balance between transaction costs and asset 
specificity, and the type of knowledge transferred and mutual learning. Figure 1 illustrates 
these quantities and places OI strategies in a matrix.  
Figure 1 about here 
First, cooperation might help to absorb the knowledge from contracts, generating new 
recombinations. The potential for new recombinations is based on the idea of taper 
integration, developed by Rothaermel et al. (2006), who affirmed that a firm creates synergy 
through simultaneously accomplishing vertical integration and strategic outsourcing. As a 
result, taper integration may reduce transaction costs, enhance strategic flexibility, increase 
access to diverse sources of knowledge, integrate tacit knowledge and complementary assets, 
and thereby enhance the development of new products and increases a firm’s product 
portfolio. Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) argued that cooperation may mitigate the negative effects 
from over-outsourcing on innovation performance. One reason for that behavior was partner 
variety, which increases the likelihood of accessing novel and unique knowledge that could be 
redeployed within a firm. Since each OI strategy has its unique advantages and drawbacks, an 
adequate combination will enhance firms’ flexibility and innovation (Spithoven and Teirlinck 
2015). Thus, a base of R&D from cooperation, do not fully eliminate the risk of external 
dependence and it may create new recombinations since different types of knowledge are 
combined, suggesting a complementary effect between OI breadth strategies. 
Second, cooperation breadth generates an external relationship management capability—a 
‘relational capital’ that can mitigate the problems of contract formation. Many firms invest in 
specific assets to manage cooperative activities, creating a dedicated alliance management 
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department (Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002; Kale and Singh 2007, 2009; Sampson 2005; Schilke 
and Goerzen 2010), or a specific committee consisting of members of each part of a 
collaborative agreement (Hagedoorn and Hesen 2007). In this regard, another reason for the 
positive moderator role of cooperation, according to Grimpe and Kaiser (2010), is increased 
experience, as the experience of collaborating with a large variety of partners facilitates the 
interactions with outsourcers and makes firms recognize superior resource deployments more 
easily. The synergetic effect between OI breadth strategies comes up when a high degree of 
partner diversity is used by both strategies. The potential for misunderstanding and costly 
miscommunication is mitigated as firms get more experience in R&D outsourcing and 
cooperation. 
Firms create a relational capital that can be used by both strategies. The relational capital 
provided by cooperative activities, which are based on mutual trust and interaction and curb 
opportunistic and disloyal behaviors (Gulati 1998), creates a basis for learning and know-how 
transfer (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000) that facilitates external knowledge acquisitions. 
Poppo and Zenger (2002) assert that the interdependence between partners as a consequence 
of a relational governance improves the exchange outcome. When combining cooperation 
breadth with R&D outsourcing breadth, firms could benefit from economies of scale and 
scope. 
Overall, combining R&D outsourcing breadth with cooperation could contribute to the 
adoption of economies of scale and scope in building relational capital, at the same time that 
using both breadth strategies enhances the likelihood of new combinations. Thus, cooperation 
breadth positively moderates the relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and 
innovation performance, avoiding the negative effects of over-openness in R&D outsourcing: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation 
performance is positively moderated by cooperation breadth.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Sample 
We test our model on a representative sample of Spanish firms from the database Spanish 
Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC), collected by the Spanish National Statistics 
Institute (INE). The survey was implemented in 2003 and it is based on the annual Spanish 
responses to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), whose method and types of questions 
are described in Oslo Manual (OECD 2005). CIS data has been used in numerous academic 
papers across Europe, for example, in Germany (Grimpe and Kaiser 2010), Belgium 
(Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, 2006; Spithoven, Clarysse and Knockaert 2011), the United 
Kingdom (Laursen and Salter 2006); and in other non-European countries, such as Taiwan 
(Tsai and Hsieh 2009; Tsai and Wang 2009). In Spain, PITEC is a well-established research 
tool, and has been used in previous longitudinal studies (e.g., Escribano, Fosfuri and Tribó 
2009; Sandulli, Fernandez-Menendez, Rodriguez-Duarte and Lopez-Sanchez 2012; Un, 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Asakawa 2010; Vega-Jurado, Manjarrés-Henríquez and Gutiérrez-Gracia 
2010).  
The database has broad sector coverage, and includes both manufacturing and service sectors. 
PITEC divides these industries according to the standard National Classification of Economic 
Activities (CNAE) code, using a two-digit code, except when there are many firms in an 
industry and the firm’s activity is defined at three digits or when there are just a few firms, in 
which case activities are regrouped with others.  
In the survey, firms are asked to indicate whether they have been able to achieve a product 
innovation. Product innovation include both technologically new products, which refer to 
‘goods and services that differ significantly in their characteristics or intended uses from 
products previously produced by the firm’ (OECD 2005:48); and technologically improved 
products, which ‘occur through changes in materials, components and other characteristics 
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that enhance performance’ (OECD 2005:48). The questionnaire asks then firms to assert what 
share of their sales can be ascribed to innovations new to the market and which are new to the 
firm. In the questionnaire there are a series of questions about external acquisition of 
technology and the sources of knowledge for innovation. In 2004 PITEC introduced some 
changes in the questionnaire, affecting variables related to cooperation and external sources 
for technology innovation, which are central variables in our model. Due to these limitations, 
in our study we have not considered the data from the 2003 survey, and use only pooled 
longitudinal data from 2004 to 2012. We have used pooled data instead of panel data because 
maximum likelihood estimations –used for the Tobit analysis- might introduce biases (Lopez 
2011). In addition, observations produce change due to mergers, disclosure, etc., that could 
mislead (Baum and Silverman 2004; Teirlinck, Dumon and Spithoven 2010). In total, and due 
to some missing data, we consider a subsample of 61,434 observations.  
 
4.2  Measures 
Dependent variable 
Though there are different forms through which firm innovation performance can be assessed, 
we use product innovation as a proxy to indicate the innovative performance by firms as it has 
been traditionally used in literature (Belderbos, Carree and Lokshin 2004; Faems, van Looy 
and Debackere 2005; Faems, de Visser, Andries and van Looy 2010; Nieto and Santamaria 
2007). We measure product innovation performance (Newprod) as proportion relative to the 
turnover of new or strongly improved products that the company introduced to the market and 
that were new to the market or to the firm. New products to the market or to the firm are 
mutually exclusive since they add up to 100%, so Newprod ranges from 0 to 100. 
 
Independent variables 
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Our study analyzes the impact of two inbound OI strategies on the innovation performance of 
the firm: cooperation breadth and R&D outsourcing breadth. First, cooperation breadth refers 
to agreements with a diversity of external sources—suppliers, customers, public sector 
customers, competitors, consultants, universities and research centers. We consider that 
partner diversity must be considered to measure cooperative agreements since it has been 
proven to have an impact on innovation performance (Laursen and Salter 2006; Oerlemans et 
al. 2013). Following the methodology of Laursen and Salter (2006), the variable cooperation 
breadth (coop) is constructed as the addition of seven sources of collaboration. Thus, each of 
the seven sources is coded as a binary variable, 0 being no use and 1 being use of the 
knowledge source. Subsequently, the seven sources are added up so that each firm gets a 0 
when no collaboration sources are used, and a firm gets the value of 7 when all collaboration 
sources are used.  
Second, in the survey, firms are asked whether they have acquired external R&D, that is, if 
they have outsourced-in R&D technology. As cooperation, R&D outsourcing is also 
measured in terms of diversity of outsourcers. Thus, R&D outsourcing breadth (out) is 
constructed as the addition of six sources of outsourcing: firms, research centers, public 
sector, universities, no governmental organizations, and other international organizations. 
Each of the six sources is coded as a binary variable, 0 being no use and 1 being use of the 
knowledge source. Again, the six sources are added up so that each firm gets a 0 when no 
outsourcing sources are used, and a firm gets the value of 6 when all outsourcing sources are 
used.  
Considering the U-inverted shape of R&D outsourcing breadth, we square the variable 
outsourcing (out2). We include the interaction variables among cooperation breadth and R&D 
outsourcing breadth (coop_out), and the interaction between cooperation breadth and R&D 
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outsourcing breadth squared (coop_out2) to test the impact of a joint adoption of these OI 
strategies on the innovation performance.  
 
Control variables 
In order to rule out possible alternative explanations to those formally hypothesized, the 
model includes the following control variables. Previous research has discussed that firm age 
has a positive (Tsai et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2013) or negative (Wang and Li-Ying 2014) 
impact on innovation. To clarify inconsistent findings we include firm age (Logage), which is 
measured as the logarithm of the number of years between the foundation of the firm and the 
observation year. We also control for firm size (Logsize) as it has been argued to be relevant 
for firms’ innovative behavior (Berchicci 2013; Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). This variable 
is measured by the logarithm of the total number of employees. As scholars consider internal 
R&D to be crucial for innovation (Lin et al. 2013; Schmiedeberg 2008), we include firm’s 
internal R&D efforts (Intrd), measured as the proportion of its internal innovation expenses. 
Another input variable that might affect innovation performance is the firm’s patent activity 
(Pat) (Faems et al. 2005). We measured it as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm has applied for a patent. To reflect that our results are not simple reflecting R&D 
outsourcing intensity, but indeed the breadth of it, we include a control variable for R&D 
outsourcing investment (Outintensity). It is measured as the share of R&D external expenses. 
We have included a sector variable control (CNAE) to test if there are differences across 
manufacturing industry sectors since previous studies (Tsai 2009; Veugelers 1997; Wang et 
al. 2013) have indicated that it is necessary to correct the fixed industry effects. Finally, we 
have created dummy variables (Year) to control the possible bias of the observation year (Un 
et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2013). Controlling time-varying effects is necessary in a rapidly 
changing environment such as technology and innovation, and to check if the economic crisis 
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impact on results. The year 2004 was the default. A short description of the variables used to 
test the model and their references are included in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
 
5. Statistical method and results 
This study uses pooled data from 2004 to 2012 to test our hypothesis. Table 3 summarizes the 
number of observations included per year and it reports the basic statistics of the variables 
used in the analysis (except industry and year dummies). The data reveals interesting points. 
Along the nine-year period the firms’ turnover from new or strongly improved products that 
were new to the market or to the firm (newprod) does not form a linear pattern but attained its 
maximum values from 2005 to 2010 and the lowest in 2004 and 2011-2012. The cooperation 
breadth variable (coop) increases throughout the period (from 0.79 to 1.02), excluding the 
year 2004, when it was higher (0.89) than for subsequent years. R&D outsourcing breadth 
(out) was considerable higher in 2004 (0.51) and quite similar through the rest of the periods 
(around 0.43). R&D outsourcing intensity (outintensity) forms a similar pattern. It could be 
that firms are moving from R&D outsourcing to R&D cooperation, instead of looking for 
complementary behaviors. We also calculated means and standard deviations only for firms 
that stated they follow an open innovation strategy (not reported for the sake of brevity) and 
we found that due to the fact that many firms do not have any R&D partner, our reported 
levels of breadth are low. If we only look to firms that reported cooperation breadth, the 
breadth average is 2.6; and for those which reported R&D outsourcing breadth, the breadth 
average is 1.4. Correlation coefficients of the major variables used in the model are reported 
in Table 4.  
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
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This study follows the procedure suggested by Friedrich (1982) to reduce or eliminate any 
bias resulting from multicollinearity because of interaction terms. This procedure first 
standardizes the independent variables, and then forms the cross-product terms. In addition, a 
VIF (variance inflation factor) test is used to evaluate the effect of multicollinearity. Only the 
VIF for the variable interaction variables exceed 10, but since it is constructed through the 
interaction of two standardized variables, we do not believe it contaminates our results; the 
VIFs for the rest of variables are smaller than 10. 
The econometric model that will be used to test the hypothesis is based on a (double) 
censored dependent variable—innovative performance—, which is measured as a percentage 
of turnover and therefore by definition ranges between 0 and 100, and a set of independent 
variables that represent OI strategies breadth and its interaction, and control variables. 
Following Laursen and Salter (2006), a censored Tobit model is applied. This model was 
proposed by James Tobin (1958) to estimate relationships between variables when there is 
either left- or right- censoring or both left-censored and right-censored in the dependent 
variable. In our case, the sample is both-side censored, the lower limit is 0, and the upper limit 
100, since our dependent variable ranges between those values. Our latent model would be as 
follows: 
y*i = Newprod = β0 + β1Coop + β2Out + β3Out2 + β4 Coop*Out + β5Coop*Out2 + β6Age + 
β7CNAEdummies + β8Yeardummies + ε, ε ~ N(0, σ2) 
However, the assumption of normality of residuals in our model is not satisfied. To address 
this problem, Laursen and Salter (2006) assumed a lognormal distribution for the residuals of 
the Tobit model. We also apply this approach and we introduce a latent variable, lnnewprod, 
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as a logarithmic transformation of an observed measure of product innovation, lnnewprod = 
ln(1+newprod)1. 
Sample selection poses a potential problem with this analysis and data, because we can only 
analyze those firms that answered the questionnaire. As a result, selective reporting may bias 
our results (Heckman 1979). We use Heckman selection model in two-steps to control for a 
possible sample selection bias in our continuous dependent variable. We first define a 
dependent variable with a dummy value: 1 if the firm made product innovations; 0, if the 
firms did not make any new product. We then use the Probit model to estimate the model 
parameters, including our independent and control variables of the model, and a dummy 
variable indicating if the firm bought machinery, equipment and software, as corrected term. 
This latter variable could impact the introduction of new products to market as they are basic 
assets for the innovation process, but not in the amount of innovation because they are fixed 
assets. The process of this calculation is omitted for the sake of brevity. The inverse of Mills-
ratio indicates that the null hypothesis is not significant at 95% of confidence (ϒ= 0.228, 
p>0.05), thus our results do not suffer from sample-selection bias.  
The results of the Tobit regression can be found in Table 5. First, we estimate Model I, which 
contains the control variables (for reasons of space we do not include all results from industry 
and year dummy variables in the table). Model II contains the direct effects of OI strategies 
breadth—cooperation and outsourcing—on product innovation. Finally, in Model III we 
introduce the interaction terms between the OI strategies breadth for different levels of 
outsourcing breadth. 
The estimators of model II shows R&D outsourcing breadth behavior, drawing an inverted-U 
shape related to innovation performance since the parameter for R&D outsourcing breadth 
variable (Out) is significant and positive (β=0.402, p<0.01), and the parameter for outsourcing 
                                                          
1 Note: The lognormal transformation does not change the signs, nor the significance for the key variables’ parameters in the subsequent 
estimations. 
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squared (Out2) is significant as well and it is negative (β=-0.288, p<0.01). Hence, it supports 
our first hypothesis that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D outsourcing 
breadth and innovation performance. We also verified that cooperation breadth is positively 
related to innovation performance (β=0.345, p<0.01) as suggested in the literature (Leiponen 
and Helfat 2010). 
The estimation of Model III shows the interaction coefficients between cooperation breadth 
and R&D outsourcing breadth. We hypothesized that the relationship between R&D 
outsourcing breadth and innovation performance is positively moderated by cooperation 
breadth (Hypothesis 2). Our results show that between medium and high levels of R&D 
outsourcing, the relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation performance 
is positively moderated by cooperation breadth since the parameter Coop_Out2 is significant 
and positive (β=0.049, p<0.05), hence there are increasing returns to innovation performance. 
However, for low to medium levels of R&D outsourcing, the model reveals that the 
relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation performance is negatively 
moderated by cooperation breadth since the parameter Coop_Out is significant and negative 
(β=-0.111, p<0.01); hence there are decreasing returns to innovation performance when both 
strategies are combined. Thereby, our hypothesis that cooperation positively moderates the 
relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation performance is partially 
confirmed.  
Table 5 about here 
Figure 2 shows interactive effect of R&D outsourcing breadth and cooperation breadth on 
innovative performance for different levels of breadth. The chart shows that between low to 
medium levels of R&D outsourcing breadth, the contribution of cooperation breadth to 
innovation performance diminishes. It suggests that at this level of R&D outsourcing breadth, 
the OI strategies analyzed are substitutes. In contrast, the figure shows that the contribution of 
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cooperation breadth increases when the level of R&D outsourcing breadth is medium to high. 
Hence, cooperation breadth enhances innovation performance, suggesting that in this case, 
cooperation breadth and R&D outsourcing have complementary effects. These findings 
highlight the complexity of understanding the relationship between the breadths of different 
strategies of openness in shaping firms’ innovative performance. 
Figure 2 about here 
Of our control variables, the age of the firm has a negative effect on innovation performance 
since along the three models its parameter (Logage) is significant and negative (β=-0.199, 
p<0.01, β=-0.187, p<0.01 and β=-0.188, p<0.01, respectively). It suggests that older 
organizations may have greater resistance to new ideas. Applying for patents has a positive 
impact on innovation performance (β=1.017, p<0.01, β=0.817, p<0.01 and β=0.815, p<0.01, 
respectively). The parameters for industry dummies are partially significant; in particular, 
there is a positive relationship with those related to textile and shoe industries, electronic 
equipment and information systems; and a negative relationship with plumbing industry and 
construction. Time effects may have an influence on innovation performance since year 
dummy coefficients are all significant and positive, except for 2012. 
To ensure the robustness of the above findings, this study also runs different estimates for 
different samples (not reported for the sake of brevity). Because our sample includes data 
relative to some years after the financial crisis, we first exclude the initial year (2004) in our 
estimation, and then the final year (2012). The results of the Tobit regressions and the 
adjusted-R2 and Chi-squared values indicate that the models fit to data (adj-R2=0.0311, 
χ2=6230.54, p<0.01; adj-R2=0.0303, χ2=6069.26, p<0.01, respectively); the estimated 
coefficients for outsourcing and outsourcing square are significant and show an U-inverted 
shape (out, β=0.433, p<0.01; out2, β=-0.278, p<0.01; β=0.428, p<0.01; out2, β=-0.269, 
p<0.01, respectively), and the interaction effect are significant and their signs are the same as 
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those presented in Table 5 (Coop_out, β=-0.113, p<0.01; Coop_out2, β=0.052, p<0.05; 
Coop_out, β=-0.107, p<0.01; Coop_out2, β=0. 046, p<0.05, respectively). 
We also checked the robustness of our results by running separate regressions for high-tech 
and low-tech sectors (Luker and Lyons 1997). Both models fit to data (adj-R2=0.0155, 
χ2=499.70, p<0.01; adj-R2=0.0208, χ2=3901.60, p<0.01, respectively), and in both cases, 
outsourcing draws an inverted-U shape (out, β=0.336, p<0.01; out2, β=-0.218, p<0.01; 
β=0.508, p<0.01; out2, β=-0.376, p<0.01, respectively), but we only found a significant 
interaction effect for low-tech firms (Coop_out, β=-0.115, p<0.01; Coop_out2, β=0.067, 
p<0.01). This might be due to the fact that firms behave differently with respect to their 
outsourcing strategy. Thus, the impact of outsourcing breadth is stronger for low-tech firms, 
while this effect is flatter for high-tech companies, impeding the sharing of relational capital 
between R&D outsourcing and cooperation. This result is in line with previous literature as 
firms with higher R&D capacity are better able to improve their innovative outcome through 
investing more in cooperation activities and relatively less in R&D outsourcing (Berchicci 
2013). 
 
6. Discussion  
The aim of this study was to analyze the impact of R&D outsourcing breadth, as well as the 
moderator effect of cooperation on innovation performance. External knowledge sources are 
increasingly being used in firms’ innovative processes (Laursen and Salter 2006). While most 
of literature has mainly studied breadth in cooperative activities (Collins and Riley 2013; 
Faems et al. 2005; Laursen and Salter 2006; Leeuw et al. 2014; Oerlemans et al. 2013; 
Rothaermel and Deeds 2006), this study evidenced that sourcing breadth can be also useful to 
analyze the impact of R&D outsourcing. Our results showed that there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and the innovation performance of a 
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firm. It means it is beneficial for firms since it avoids risks about uncertain R&D, decreases 
internal research costs and accelerates the innovation process (Baloh, Jha and Awazu 2008; 
Gilley and Rasheed 2000; Howells et al. 2008; Rundquist and Halila 2010; Tsai and Wang 
2009). That said, investing too much in external technology acquisition could create an 
external dependence (Rothaermel et al. 2006), which prevents firms from developing their 
own internal R&D and absorbing external knowledge. 
Firms frequently use multiple strategies at the same time and this fact has barely been 
analyzed by OI scholars. Open innovation is not just a single strategy of external technology 
access, but a framework for multiple strategies. We consider that an OI framework must cover 
different strategies because each strategy has its own features. Hence, this paper focused on 
the combination of the breadth of two main strategies used by Spanish firms: cooperation and 
R&D outsourcing. We proposed that a positive moderator role of cooperation breadth in the 
relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation performance. Grimpe and 
Kaiser (2010) tested that the relationship between R&D outsourcing intensity and innovation 
performance is positively moderated by the breadth of formal R&D collaborations. We went a 
step further since our model considered both strategies in terms of breadth. Hence, we argued 
that cooperation breadth moderates the relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and 
innovation performance through two mechanisms: absorptive capacity and relational capital. 
We found that cooperation moderates positively that relationship, but not in all situations. It 
was only true for medium to high levels of R&D outsourcing breadth. When firms develop 
the capacities to simultaneously manage different OI strategies, they are able to benefit from 
the breadth of both strategies. The synergetic effect of the joint adoption of cooperation 
breadth and R&D outsourcing breadth allow firms to improve innovation outcomes. The 
negative effect of cooperation between low and medium levels of R&D outsourcing breadth 
could be due to a dynamic in which the lower transactions costs of R&D outsourcing breadth 
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make it a viable option that outweighs the benefits of diverse tacit knowledge from 
cooperation, though with higher cooperation costs due to co-specialized asset investments and 
coordination and control costs. Cooperation breadth and R&D outsourcing breadth require a 
different management approach. Therefore, it provokes a substitutive effect between OI 
strategies. Another explanation could be that between low and medium levels of R&D 
outsourcing breadth, it is difficult to build shared relational capital from cooperation breadth 
because common relationships are less likely to be found and these strategies are therefore 
substitutes.  
The results of our control variables suggest that the older the firm, the more reluctant it is to 
introduce new products. This can be explained by the fact that older firms tend to focus solely 
on mature areas in which they have extensive knowledge, rather than seeking out innovative 
opportunities (Tsai, Hsieh and Hultink 2011). The extent of innovative performance is also 
dependent on the industry sector; in particular, it is more intense for electronic equipment and 
information systems. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study focused on two different OI strategies—cooperation breadth and R&D outsourcing 
breadth—, and empirically analyzed the relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and 
innovation performance, and the moderator role of cooperation breadth on that relationship, in 
order to explain the synergetic impact of its combination. By studying breadth in R&D 
outsourcing and the moderator role of cooperation, we contribute to the OI literature in the 
following ways. First, literature has mainly studied breadth in cooperative activities. This 
study measured R&D outsourcing in terms of breadth, in an analogous manner to that used for 
cooperation breadth. We found that R&D outsourcing breadth formed an inverted-U 
relationship with innovative performance. Second, our paper offers another perspective with 
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regard to the traditional ‘buy’, ‘make’ or ‘ally’ trade-off. While previous research has 
addressed their single impact on innovation performance (e.g. Laursen and Salter 2006; 
Leiponen and Helfat 2010), we compared and combined both R&D strategies—cooperation 
breadth and R&D outsourcing breadth—in a same model. Firms use different strategies at the 
same time, but empirical research barely analyze the interaction effect between strategies. A 
significant contribution of this paper is the study of the interrelationships between outsourcing 
and cooperation. Measuring both variables in terms of breadth allow us to discover the 
synergies between them. Our findings revealed that the impact of cooperation breadth on the 
relationship between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation performance depends on the 
level of R&D outsourcing breadth. The combination of these strategies has a negative effect 
on innovation performance between low and medium levels of R&D outsourcing breadth 
because these strategies might be substitutes. However, between medium to high levels of 
R&D outsourcing breadth, cooperation exerts a positive effect because firms build relational 
capital that can be used by both strategies, generating economies of scale and scope. Future 
research literature should consider not only the combination of OI strategies, but also the level 
of breadth of each strategy.  
This study has also some implications for practitioners. First, it is clear that the positive 
impact of OI strategies for innovation outcome, and thus R&D external relationships, must be 
an integral part of the business model for new product development. Nevertheless, we have 
evidenced an inverted U-shaped relation between R&D outsourcing breadth and innovation 
performance, so managers should not surpass a certain level of R&D outsourcing breadth. 
Doing so increases the risk of external dependence, blocks the creation of firms’ knowledge 
base and hampers the firms’ absorptive capacity, and as a result, harms the innovation 
outcome. Next, the interaction of different OI strategies does not always exhibit 
complementarities. As our research shows, there is a potential for diseconomies in OI 
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combining deployment between low to medium levels of outsourcing breadth. Hence, it may 
take time for managers to develop capacities to deal with a combination of OI strategies 
because of the costs and managerial capacities needed to deal with a joint adoption of 
different innovation strategies. Finally, in an era of open innovation, policy makers should 
also design targeted policies that boost knowledge flows between firms. Currently, incentives 
for collaboration are given to big and high-intensive R&D firms (Barge-Gil 2010), but 
policies should also be focused on small and medium firms because we found that these kind 
of firms are more innovative and they are also implementing OI strategies. 
Although this study reveals some interesting points, it has several limitations. First, the 
analysis of secondary data, such as PITEC, does not let the researcher take into account 
observations other than those included in the externally pre-established questionnaire. The use 
of primary data would have introduced the benefits of direct observational methods research 
(Laursen and Salter 2006). In particular, we compared OI strategies breadths basing our 
arguments on costs, asset specificity, type of knowledge and learning considerations, but 
these characteristics could not be directly observed. Using a questionnaire would improve the 
analysis of different OI strategies, and other constructs could be used to measure these 
variables. In the same manner, we considered a restrictive definition of relational capital 
because PITEC did not provide information for a broader concept, such as the one used in 
Capello and Faggian (2005). Second, we have examined R&D outcomes through a percentage 
of new products as related to turnover. Future research could consider other innovative 
performances, such as process innovation or focus on the distinction between incremental and 
radical innovations. Third, PITEC has been anonymized to avoid the identification of firms. 
This limits our analyses as we could only consider pooled data. Fourth, our goal was not 
meant to be exhaustive in our discussion of inbound OI strategies, although it would have 
been possible to make more fine-grained, within-category distinctions. For example, some 
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studies (Tsai and Wang 2009), also include licensing as a market procurement practice, but 
our data do not provide information about the breadth of licenses. Fifth, it would be desirable 
to use sampling frames other than just Spanish firms to extend the validity of the findings.  
Lastly, this study also raises some interesting issues for future research. When firms embrace 
OI strategies they should consider not only the benefits associated with them but also their 
drawbacks. In particular, companies should ask themselves whether they have the resources 
and organizational capabilities to manage not only a particular strategy, but several strategies 
at the same time. Firms’ deficiencies in successfully managing OI strategies underscore the 
need to develop organizational capabilities. These capacities may be complementary when 
firms combine OI strategies. Research on the joint adoption of OI strategies is almost non-
existent. Thereby, one fruitful area for future research may be to focus on factors that may be 
complementary to OI strategies.  
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Appendices 
Table 1.  
R&D outsourcing and cooperation features 
Dimension R&D Outsourcing Cooperation 
Relationship duration Short-term relationship Medium- or long-term relationship 
Knowledge Explicit Tacit 
Learning Low High 
Transaction costs Low - medium Medium - high 
Asset specificity Low High 
39 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 2.  
Variable description 
Variable Description References 
Newprod Proportion relative to turnover of new or strongly 
improved products that the company introduced 
to the market and that were new to the market or 
to the firm. 
Belderbos et al. (2004); 
Faems et al. (2005, 2010); 
Nieto and Santamaria (2007) 
Coop Addition of seven sources of collaboration: 
suppliers, customers, public sector customers, 
competitors, consultants, universities, and 
research centers. 
Laursen and Salter (2006) 
Out Addition of six sources of outsourcing: firms, 
research centers, public sector, universities, no 
governmental organizations, and other 
international organizations. 
Extended from Laursen and 
Salter (2006) 
Coop_out Interaction between coop and out variables. - 
Coop_out2 Interaction between coop and out square 
variables. 
- 
Age Natural logarithm of the number of years between 
the foundation of the firm and the observation 
year. 
Tsai et al. (2011); Wang et al. 
(2013); Wang and Li-Ying 
(2014) 
Size Natural logarithm of the total number of 
employees. 
Berchicci (2013); Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002) 
Intrd Proportion of firm’s internal innovation expenses. Lin et al. (2013); 
Schmiedeberg (2008) 
Pat Dummy variable for firm’s application of patents. Faems et al. (2005) 
Outintensity Share of R&D external expenses. Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) 
CNAE A set of dummy variables for our CNAE sectors, 
the Spanish equivalent of SIC codes. 
Un et al. (2010) 
Year A set of dummy variables for the observation 
year. 
Un et al. (2010); Wang et al. 
(2013) 
 
Table 3 
Means and standard deviations of major variables used in the analysis 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Obs. 5,506 7,503 7,519 7,325 7,158 7,112 7,069 6,310 5,932 
Newprod 22.22 28.04 26.58 26.08 28.42 28.77 28.93 25.77 22.78 
(32.29) (37.16) (36.26) (35.99) (37.03) (36.98) (37.04) (36.20) (34.62) 
Coop 0.89 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.88 0.9 0.95 1.01 1.02 
(1.53) (1.44) (1.49) (1.55) (1.58) (1.62) (1.68) (1.75) (1.70) 
Out 0.51 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.43 
(0.77) (0.74) (0.75) (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.80) (0.81) 
Age 22.49 21.7 22.65 23.79 25.07 26.22 27.32 28.46 29.46 
(19.91) (19.76) (19.76) (20.02) (20.51) (20.61) (20.64) (21.00) (20.81) 
Size 304.39 263.70 282.76 307.74 322.24 327.90 331.56 357.95 358.72 
(1322.62) (1191.11) (1308.41) (1493.45) (1555.89) (1637.40) (1576.09) (1699.63) (1769.78) 
Pat 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
(0.40) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
Intrd 65.80 59.25 54.82 52.65 52.07 49.21 47.26 51.94 54.77 
(40.68) (39.64) (42.35) (42.01) (42.40) (42.61) (42.88) (43.03) (43.12) 
Outintensity 14.56 9.34 10.14 10.20 9.79 9.48 9.12 9.54 9.00 
40 
 
(27.63) (20.31) (22.37) (22.02) (21.53) (21.48) (20.91) (21.81) (21.03) 
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
Table 4.  
Correlation coefficients of major variables used in the model 
 Newprod Coop Out Logage Logsize Pat Intrd 
Newprod        
p-value        
Coop 0.088       
p-value 0.000       
Out 0.047 0.408      
p-value 0.000 0.000      
Logage -0.102 -0.006 0.022     
p-value 0.000 0.131 0.000     
Logsize -0.077 0.145 0.108 0.376    
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Pat 0.089 0.212 0.213 -0.008 0.062   
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.000   
Intrd 0.111 0.168 0.089 -0.073 -0.073 0.143  
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Outintensity -0.003 0.104 0.459 0.015 0.051 0.041 -0.214 
p-value 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: This table omits the correlation coefficients of industry and time-effect dummies. 
 
Table 5.  
Tobit regression, explaining innovation performance across Spain firms. 
Model I  II  III  
Indepen Var. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Logage -0.199*** 0.020 -0.187*** 0.020 -0.188*** 0.020 
Logsize 0.010 0.009 -0.039*** 0.010 -0.039*** 0.010 
Pat 1.017*** 0.038 0.817*** 0.038 0.815*** 0.038 
Intrd 0.011*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.000 
Outintensity 0.004*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 
Coop   0.345*** 0.015 0.380*** 0.016 
Out   0.402*** 0.034 0.418*** 0.038 
Out2   -0.288*** 0.031 -0.261*** 0.039 
Coop_Out     -0.111*** 0.024 
Coop_Out2     0.049** 0.021 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time-effect 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
_cons 0.166 0.152 0.430*** 0.151 0.450*** 0.151 
/sigma 2.997 0.014 2.967 0.013 2.966 0.013 
No. of obs 61434  61434  61434  
No. of left-
censored obs 
20896  20896  20896  
No. of right-
censored obs 
8413  8413  8413  
Log 
likelihood 
-107340.75  -106881.39  -106862.6  
Chi-square 5814.64***  6733.36***  6770.95***  
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Pseudo R2 0.0264  0.0305  0.0307  
One-tailed t-test applied. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
Figure 1.         
OI strategies for knowledge transfer  
 
Source: Own elaboration 
Figure 2. 
Interactive effects between cooperation and R&D outsourcing 
 
 
 
